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REAFFIRMING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
WE'VE COME A LONG WAY, BUT NOT FAR ENOUGH
Cynthia R. Mabry*
"[T]he Adarand decision did not dismantle affirmative
action..-
I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action is "an effort to develop a system-
atic approach to open the doors of education, employ-
ment and business opportunities to qualified individu-
als who happen to be members of groups that have ex-
perienced longstanding and persistent discrimination."'
Federal affirmative action originated over thirty years
ago when President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Execu-
tive Order No. 11,246 on September 24, 1965.3 The
Executive Order announced the federal government's
policy to provide equal employment opportunities "for
all qualified persons" by prohibiting employment dis-
crimination based on race, creed, color, or national ori-
gin.4
Executive Order No. 11,246 also forbade dis-
crimination in federal government contracting and
federally funded construction contracts. s Contractor
were required to stipulate that they would not dis-
criminate in hiring, promoting, recruiting, laying off,
terminating, or compensating employees.6 Conse-
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law; J.D. 1983, Howard University School of Law;
LL.M., 1996, New York University School of Law. I acknowl-
edge and appreciate comments and suggestions from Dean
Donald Lively, Professor James McLaughlin, and Attorney Lisa
Wilson, United States Department of Justice. Also, I want to
acknowledge Professor Ann Maxey's support and her willing-
ness to share her views on the importance of diversity.
I Remarks by the President on Affirmative Action, July
19, 1995, 1995 WL 423981.Accord Is This The End of Federal
Minority Contracting? Not Hardly, FED. LAw., March/April 1995,
at 38 ('Regardless of the Supreme Court decision in Adarand,
it is highly doubtful that it will have any demonstrable nega-
tive effect on federal minority contracting").
2 Remarks by the President on Affirmative Action, July
19, 1995, 1995 WL 423981. See also Dorothy Gilliam, Dam-
aging, Destructive Doublespeak, WAsH. Posr, June 17, 1995, at
HI (opining that the definition does not include a reference
to preferences).
Assistant Attorney GeneralWalter Dellinger defined
affirmative action as "a group-based remedy: where a group
has been subject to discrimination, individual members of the
group can benefit from the remedy, even if they have not
proved that they have been discriminated against personally."
Memorandum from Dellinger to General Counsels, June 28,
1995, at 5 [hereinafter Memorandum]. See also Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,482 (1986);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986).
quently, all qualified applicants would have the same
employment and contracting opportunities. The Sec-
retary of Labor was responsible for ensuring compli-
ance with the presidential proscriptions announced
in the Order.7
Affirmative action that grew out of the Execu-
tive Order means proactive (not reactive) efforts to
foster real equality of opportunity. Affirmative ac-
tion is positive government, not negative passive gov-
ernment that existed prior to the 1960s. Taking ac-
tive affirmative steps requires setting goals based on
group statistics because proving discrimination in the
individual case is seldom easy. Discrimination usu-
ally comes with a mask of civility that hides its ugly
face or a veneer of "objectivity" that hides cultural,
ethnic, and racial bias. These "goals" may in detail ap-
pear as preferences, but they are, in the larger pic-
ture, mere signposts to success and progress toward
achieving real equality.
In the past thirty years, some major advances that
minorities, women, and small businesses made in
higher education, employment, and business can be
attributed to affirmative action programs.8 However,
"[t]his progress has not come without difficulty and has
3 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
4 Id. (promoting"the full realization of equal employment
opportunity through a positive, continuing program in each
executive department and agency").
51d. §§ 301-304.
6 d. § 202(1)-(2). Contractors were required to include
those seven provisions in every subcontract or purchase order
unless the Secretary of Labor exempted the requirement. A
contractor could be exempted from compliance with the Ex-
ecutive Order if the contract work was performed outside of
the United States and workers were not recruited in the United
States, the contract was for commercial supplies or raw mate-
rials, the contract involved less than a specified sum of money
or a specified number of workers, or subcontracts below a speci-
fied value were involved. Id. § 204.
7Id. §§ 205-206. Contracting agencies were primarily re-
sponsible for ensuring compliance with the rules, regulations,
and the Secretary of Labor's orders. Sanctions and penalties
for non-compliance included Department of Justice proceed-
ings to enjoin or prevent actions that affect compliance, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or Department of Jus-
tice proceedings underTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
criminal proceedings, and barring the contracting agency from
entering into further contracts with any non-complying con-
tractor. Id. § 209(a).
8 Rhonda McMillion, Affirmative Action Struggle, A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1995, at 93 [hereinafter McMilion]. See also ANDREW
BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JAcroB's LADDER 290-91 (1993)[here-
been challenged by lawsuits and filings of reverse dis-
crimination appeals with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission."9
Generally, affirmative action critics articulate two
contentions. One averment is that affirmative action
causes unfair preferences for minorities and women be-
cause, in the name of affirmative action, minorities and
women receive jobs and contracts instead of more quali-
fied white males.'0 Recently, Robert Dole, the majority
leader of the Senate and a Republican presidential can-
didate, revealed his misconceptions-or misinterpreta-
tions--of affirmative action objectives Dole asserted that
discrimination and preferential treatment were wrong.
Instead of guaranteeing equal opportunity, Dole claimed,
affirmative action allowed quotas, set asides, numerical
objectives, and other preferences to divide Americans.I
The term "preference," when associated with affir-
mative action, misleads some people to incorrectly be-
lieve that affirmative action programs were designed to
give minorities opportunities without regard to their
qualifications. 12 The results of a 1992 poll illustrate dif-
fering attitudes about affirmative action and preferences.
When asked whether they favored affirmative action,
seventy percent of those polled answered in the affir-
mative while twenty-four percent responded negatively.
When the term "racial preferences" was used, only forty-
six percent of the same respondents approved of prefer-
ences.' 3 Although critics, like Senator Dole, often say
that affirmative action promotes preferences for minori-
ties and women, nowhere in Executive Order No. 11,246
does the word "preference" appear. On the other hand,
President Johnson used the word "opportunity" several
times. Moreover, he explicitly stated that qualified per-
sons should have equal opportunities.
Some critics also erroneously believe that affirma-
tive action is no longer necessary because minority people
have made significant social and economic progress since
the mid-1960s.14 Among others, Clint Bolick, Litigation
Director for the Institute for Justice, uttered this anti-
affirmative action argument. Referring to affirmative
inafter BILLINGSLEY] (demonstrating immense growth of mi-
nority-owned business enterprises partially due to affirmative
action policies); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 93-99
(1994) [hereinafter WESr] (calling affirmative action a "redis-
tributive measure ... to broaden access to America's prosper-
ity .. .'. See generally Frank Wu, Neither Black Nor White:
AsianAmericansAndAffirmativeAction, 15 B.C.THiRDWo.Lt
L.J. 225 (1995).
9 Affirmative Action: Hearings Before the Subcomm.on the
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights (Sept. 7, 1995) (tes-
timony of Reginald Wilson, Ph.D.)(quoting Vernon Jordon).
'01d.
" Senator Robert Dole, Clinton missed mark on affirma-
tive action, USATODAY, July 20, 1995, at 11A. See also Todd S.
Purdum, President gives affirmative support to fighting bias, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Purdum] (vowing "to
action, Bolick said that "racial preferences are the tools
of the 1960s and are utterly impotent in the 1990s."15
With this statement, Bolick not only misconstrued the
purposes and effects of affirmative action, but also the
continuing necessity for affirmative action programs. In
1994, Cornel West, Harvard University Professor of Af-
rican-American Studies and the Philosophy of Religion,
predicted that "it is a virtual certainty that without affir-
mative action, racial and sexual discrimination would
return with a vengeance."1
6
On June 19,1995, the United States Supreme Court
dealt a potentially disabling blow to affirmative action.
InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that
all federal, as well as state and local, governmental racial
dassifications shall be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 7
The Court remanded the matter for the lower court to
apply strict scrutiny to a federal, race-based affirmative
action program' 8
After the Adarand decision, President Clinton or-
dered all federal agencies to examine their affirmative
action policies with the same scrutiny. Thus, the vigor-
ous and loud anti-affirmative action debate was revived.
Part II of this article reviews the majority and separate
opinions in Adarand. Part III reveals public and private
reactions to Adarand and subsequent efforts to support
or weaken affirmative action programs. Finally, Part IV
discusses the constitutionality of the program challenged
in Adarand and concludes that it would survive strict
scrutiny.
II. THE ADARAND DECISION
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Section 644(g) of the Small Business Act (the Act)"
provides:
The President shall annually establish government-
wide goals for procurement contracts awarded to
small business concerns, and small business concerns
get the federal government out of the group-preference busi-
ness' ).
'2 Purdum, supra note 11.
13 Id.
"4AffirmativeActionAfterAdarand, 9 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
S-1, S-2 (Aug. 2, 1995)[hereinafter AfterAdarand].
15 Id. at S-1. Accord Equal Opportunity Act of 1995: Hear-
ings on H.R. 2128 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(statement of Clint Bolick) (outlawing preferences "while al-
lowing efforts to extend a helping hand to people outside the
economic mainstream'.
16WFsr, supra note 8, at 95.
'7115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
'Id. at 2113.
" Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1995).
owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals, and small business con-
cers owned and controlled by women. The gov-
ernment-wide goal for participation by small busi-
ness concerns shall be established at not less than
20 percent of the total value of all prime contract
awards for each fiscal year. The government-wide
goal for participation by small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals shall be established at not
less than 5 percent of the total value of all prime
contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year
.... Notwithstanding the government-wide goal,
each agency shall have an annual goal that presents,
for that agency, the maximum practicable opportu-
nity for small business concerns and small business
and economically disadvantaged individuals to par-
ticipate in the performance of contracts let by such
agency.
20
By enacting that legislation, Congress intended to
give small businesses and small businesses owned and
operated by socially and economically disadvantaged
business enterprises (DBE) a fair chance to acquire gov-
ernment contracts.
2'
In awarding government contracts, section 6 44(g)
required federal agencies to establish goals of at least
five percent DBE participation. With the authority del-
egated in the Act, the United States Department ofTrans-
portation (DOT) instituted a program to encourage
prime contractors to give DBEs "the maximum practi-
cable opportunity" to contract with DOT. As an agency
of the federal government, DOT promulgated the Sur-
face Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987 (STURAA).22 Section 106(c) of STURAA,
which is specifically applicable to federally-funded trans-
portation projects, required expenditure of not less than
ten percent of STURAA funds with DBEs.23
201d. § 644(g)(1).
2 1d. § 637(d)(1).
22 Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 144-46.
23Id. § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 145. See also 49 C.F.R. §§
23.64(e), 23.65 (1995)(permitting goals below ten percent).
24 If the contractor hired two or more DBEs, the bonus
would be ten percent of the DBE subcontract without exceed-
ing two percent of the original contract amount. See 115 S. Ct.
at 2104 (quoting the contract provision). See also 16 F.3d at
1539; Brief for Respondents at 17-18, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)(No. 93-1841)[hereinaf-
ter Brief for Respondent].
The Clause is designed to offset the financial disincen-
tives that would otherwise exist to employing and assisting
disadvantaged businesses as subcontractors by covering the
additional expenses associated with such employment. In re-
turn for compensation under the Clause, the prime contractor
thus must agree to locate, train, utilize, assist, and develop
[disadvantaged businesses] to become fully qualified contrac-
Later, the subcontractor compensation clause (SCC)
was implemented to carry out DOT's DBE goals. Under
the SCC program, a standard clause was included in all
small contracts and contracts involving small prime con-
tractors. The clause advised prime contractors that they
would receive an incentive payment when they con-
tracted with DBE subcontractors. The bonus would be
ten percent of the final value of the subcontract. How-
ever, if the prime contractor hired only one DBE sub-
contractor, the monetary bonus could not exceed 1.5
percent of the original contract amount.2 4
To qualify under STURAA, subcontracting compa-
nies had to be small businesses that were at least fifty-
one percent owned and controlled by "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged" individuals.25 To identify DBE
subcontractors for participation in the program, prime
contractors could presume that certain groups were so-
cially and economically disadvantaged.The list included
African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Asians,
other minorities, and any other individuals whom the
Small Business Administration (SBA) designated as dis-
advantaged.
26
Congress deemed those groups of people socially
disadvantaged since despite their individual qualifica-
tions as businesspersons, racial or ethric prejudice or
cultural bias foreclosed their businessLopportunities.
2 7
Moreover, under both the Act and the STURAA, some
small businesses were economically disadvantaged. Con-
gress reasoned that limited start-up capital and lack of
credit hindered the small companies' ability to compete
aggressively in the marketplace?8
B. Factual Summary
In 1989, the Central Federal LandsHighway Divi-
sion, a branch of DOT's Federal Highway Administra-
tion, awarded a highway construction contract to Moun-
tain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain
tors in the transportation facilities construction field.The Con-
tractor shall also provide direct assistance to disadvantaged
subcontractors in acquiring the necessary bonding, obtaining
price quotations, analyzing plans and specifications, and plan-
ning and management of the work.
Brief for Respondent at 17 (citations omitted).
2s 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(a)(5), 637(a)(6)(A), 637(d)(3)(C);
49 CF.R. § 23.62 (1995); 13 C.FR. § 124.103 (1995).
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(3)(C); §106(c)(2)(B), 101 Stat.
146. There is a presumption that members of the designated
groups are socially and economically disadvantaged. On the
other hand, the presumption is rebuttable. Thus, a third party
could produce evidence that the subcontractor was not so-
cially or economically disadvantaged. 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001,
19.703(a)(2); 49 C.F.R. § 23.62(a)-(e)(1995); 13 C.F.R. §
124.105(b)(1)(1995).
2715 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5).
181d. § 637(a)(6)(A). See also 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105(b)(1),
124.106(a).
Gravel). 29 As DOT policy commanded, Mountain
Gravel's contract provided that, as the prime contrac-
tor, Mountain Gravel would receive a monetary bonus
if it employed DBEs.30 So, according to its contract speci-
fications, Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcon-
tractors to install guardrails along the highway. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. (Adarand), a company that special-
ized in guardrails, submitted the lowest bid. Neverthe-
less, Mountain Gravel took advantage of its option to
receive a $10,000 bonus on its $1 million contract by
awarding the subcontract to another bidder - Gonzales
Construction Company (Gonzales).
3'
Gonzales, a Hispanic company, was certified as so-
cially and economically disadvantaged. Adarand, a white-
owned firm, was not.32 Candidly, Mountain Gravel's
Chief Estimator admitted that Mountain Gravel selected
Gonzales so that it would receive more money. Other-
wise, the Estimator conceded, Adarand would have been
chosen to install the guardrails.
33
C Procedural History
In its lawsuit against the United States Secretary of
Transportation and other federal officials, Adarand sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin future use of
SCCs. 34 Adarand challenged the incentive program as a
discriminatory race- and gender-based presumption that
would not survive scrutiny under Richmond v. IA. Croson
Co. 35 As such, Adarand alleged, the program violated its
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.
36
The government filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. It argued that the relaxed standard of review an-
9 16 F.3d 1537, 1537 (10th Cir. 1994).
30Id. at 1541-42; 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
3' 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
3zd. Either the SBA, a state highway agency, or a certify-
ing agency approved by the contracting officer must certify
that the subcontractor is a small disadvantaged business. Id. at
2104. Randy Pech, a white male, manages and controls daily
operations at Adarand. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995) (No. 93-1841)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
33115 S. Ct. at 2102.
34Id. at 2104.At the outset, the Supreme Court concluded
that Adarand had standing to seek damages for the contract it
lost as well as to enjoin future reliance on financial incentives
to induce prime contractors to hire DBEs. Id. at 2104-05 (in-
dicating that Adarand"is very likely to" bid on future contracts
for guardrail work and will have to compete against DBEs).
35 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). See also Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1544 (advocating that
particularized findings of past discrimination were needed to
justify the race-conscious subcontractor program).
36 115 S. Ct. at 2104, 2105-06. The Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution provides that"[n]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
nounced in Fullilove v. Klutznick37 was controlling au-
thority instead of the strict scrutiny standard used in
Croson.38 The district court judge agreed with the gov-
ernment, applied Fullilove, and granted the government's
motion.39 The district court ruled that the federal gov-
ernment had a legitimate interest in remedying past dis-
crimination and the SCC program was narrowly tailored
to achieve that goal.
40
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Adarand stipulated
that section 644(g) authorized establishment of the SCCs
and that the provision satisfied Fullilove evidentiary re-
quirements.41 Applying a lesser standard than Croson
required-an intermediate scrutiny standard-the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the
SCCs were constitutional.
42
When Adarand petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari, the Court granted
the petition.43 Before the Supreme Court, Adarand ar-
gued that the court of appeals had erroneously relied
upon Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 44 Specifically,
Adarand took exception to the court's application of an
intermediate scrutiny analysis to a federal race-conscious
classification. The proper test, Adarand contended, was
strict scrutiny-the same standard applied to state ac-
tion in Croson.
4s
Government representatives continued to defend
the constitutionality of the SCC program.They asserted
that the program was based upon a subcontractor's dis-
advantaged status, not its race.46 The government con-
ceded, however, that the race-based rebuttable presump-
tion used to certify some subcontractors was subject to
heightened scrutiny.
47
cess of law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. After a long discussion
regarding whether the Fifth Amendment prohibited racial clas-
sifications in federal as well as state legislation, the Court de-
cided that the equal protection obligations in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are indistinguishable.
115 S. Ct. at 2106-08.
3"448 U.S. 448 (1980).
3816 F.3d at 1542-43.
39Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240,
243-44 (D. Colo. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995)(distinguishing Croson).
40 790 F. Supp. at 244-45.
4116 F.3d at 1544 (conceding further that CFLHD's use
of the incentive program was within its delegated power un-
der section 644(g)).421d. at 1543, 1546-47 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 484 (1980))
43 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
44497 U.S. 547 (1990).
4s Brief for Petitioner, supra note 32, at 25-28 (criticizing
the court of appeals' use of a lenient standard).
4 115 S. Ct. at 2105; Brief for Respondents, supra note
24, at 26.
47115 S. Ct. at 2105.
D. Supreme Court Opinion
Justice O'Connor wrote the five-four majority opin-
ion. Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy joined the entire
opinion, while Justices Scalia and Thomas joined most
of the opinion. Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the well-
settled rule that racial and ethnic distinctions were in-
herently suspect; therefore, they must be examined with
the strictest judicial scrutiny.48 In doing so, the Court
overruled the portion of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. that
had applied an intermediate scrutiny standard.49 Accord-
ing to the Court, the Metro Broadcasting, Inc. holding
was inconsistent with three principles that the Supreme
Court had advanced for decades. The Court had ex-
pressed skepticism about all racial and ethnic classifica-
tions. Additionally, the Court had promoted "consistency
of treatment irrespective of race," and congruent appli-
cation of the same standard of review to racial classifi-
cations imposed by state, local, and federal govern-
ments.5 0
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor wrote that "any per-
son, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify
any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."s
"[D]etailed judicial inquiry" of racial classifications was
needed to prevent encroachment upon an individual's
personal right s2 to equal protection of the laws. Accord-
ingly, the Court adopted the two-part strict scrutiny test
that Justice O'Connor had devised in Croson.53 In Croson,
the Supreme Court analyzed the City of Richmond,
Virginia's ordinance that thirty percent of its contract-
ing work would be set aside for minority-owned busi-
nesses. The Court held that strict judicial scrutiny must
be applied to all state and local governmental racial clas-
sifications. Such scrutiny would "smoke out",
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legisla-
tive body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also
ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling





52 See generally Stephen Minnich, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny ofAffirmative Action, 46 CASE W.
Rss. L. REv. 279,299-302 (1995) (discussing the views of indi-
vidualists and group rights theorists).
53488 U.S. at 493. See also 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
54 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
SS115 S. Ct. at 2113.
16 Id. "Strict scrutiny... evaluates carefully all govern-
mental race-based decisions in order to decide which are con-
stitutionally objectionable and which are not." Id.
that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype. 4
Six years after the Supreme Court decided Croson, it
expanded the Croson holding. InAdarand, the Court ruled
that a reviewing court must analyze all racial classifica-
tions imposed by either federal, state, or local governments
with strict scrutiny.55 With this ruling, the Court finally
resolved the uncertainty regarding the standard of review
for federally imposed race-based classifications.
The Adarand Court stressed that its ruling did not
mean that strict scrutiny analysis would be "fatal in fact"
and render all racial classifications illegal. Conversely,
Justice O'Connor reiterated that strict scrutiny was a
method of distinguishing legitimate racial classifications
from illegitimate classifications.5 6 Thus, though racial
classifications were presumptively invalid, some classi-
fications could survive an equal protection challenge if
they were necessary to achieve a compelling governmen-
tal interest.
5 7
Having engaged in lengthy discourse about the stan-
dard for reviewing federal racial classifications, the Su-
preme Court declined to apply the standard in Adarand.
Instead, it vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision and re-
manded the matter for a strict scrutiny "analysis of the
SCC program. The Supreme Court ordered the review-
ing court to consider two issues: (1) whether the SCC
program served compelling interests, and (2) whether
the racial dassification was narrowly tailored to achieve
those goals.
58
The Court further suggested that the lower court
should discover whether race-neutral means to increase
minority business participation in government contract-
ing had been considered. Also, the reviewing court should
decide whether the duration of the program was lim-
ited.A program should not last longer than the discrimi-
natory effects it was intended to eliminate.5 9
E. Separate Opinions
In two separate dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in part. Both agreed that strict
71 Id. The Court reaffirmed precedent holding that rem-
edying the effects of past discrimination is a compelling gov-
ernment interest. The Court further held, however, that racial
dassifications rarely justify disparate treatment. Id. at 2113,
2117.
"8Id. at 2118.
s9 Id. (citations omitted). The Court also highlighted dis-
crepancies between definitions and requirements in the SBA
and DOT regulations that implemented STURAA. For in-
stance, DOT regulations do not appear to require certification
that every applicant is economically disadvantaged, whereas
the SBA regulation does require such certification. Id.
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.0 How-
ever, for different reasons, they concluded that the SCC
program would not pass strict scrutiny. Justice Scalia
asserted that "[i]n the eyes of government, we are just
one race." Therefore, no governmental interest would
be compelling enough to justify governmental discrimi-
nation to make amends for past discrimination. 61 Simi-
larly, and not surprisingly in light of other opinions he
has written, Justice Thomas declared that the "racial pa-
ternalism ... that appears to lie at the heart of this pro-
gram is at war with the principle of inherent equality
that underlies and infuses our Constitution."62
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion that Jus-
tice Ginsburg joined. Justice Stevens disagreed with the
majority decision that the same standard of review should
be applicable to federal, state, and local programs.63 He
contended that the concept of congruence was inconsis-
tent with the deference that the Court always had given
Congress.64 "Congressional deliberations about a matter
as important as affirmative action should be accorded
far greater deference than those of a state or municipal-
ity.165
In disagreement with Justices Scalia and Thomas,
Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should have
affirmed the court of appeal's judgment.66 Acknowledg-
ing that society "should be wary of" governmental racial
classifications, Justice Stevens opined that litigants would
disagree about the outcome of review even under a uni-
form standard. 67 Moreover, Justice Stevens opposed
equating invidious discrimination with remedial race-
based preferences. He averred that the two concepts were
distinguishable. "Invidious discrimination is an engine of
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance
or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-
based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire
to foster equality in society."68 While invidious discrimi-
nation is "repugnant [to] a free, democratic society, [re-
60Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).611d. at 2118. Justice Scalia reasoned that victims of dis-
crimination were entitled to be made whole but not at the
expense of non-minorities. "[U]nder our Constitution, there
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race." Id.
This opinion is consistent with Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion in Croson. 488 U.S. at 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
62 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (describing "government-sponsored
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice").
6 Id. at 2120 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2123-25 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S.
at 563; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472,490).
65115 S. Ct. at 2120.
6Id.
6 Id.
6MId. By way of analogy, Justice Stevens illustrates his point
First, a "No Trespassing" sign is different from a welcome mat.
medial preferences are] entirely consistent with the ideal
of equality."O
Regardless, Justice Stevens averred that the SCC
program satisfied any standard-including the strict scru-
tiny standard- announced in any affirmative action pre-
cedent.70 Justice Stevens asserted that the SCC pro-
gram remedied past discrimination and attempted to
compensate for disadvantages that minority contractors
experienced. Typically, new minority enterprises were
not socially connected with businesspersons who would
award subcontracts to them.7' Therefore, minority
businesspersons were disadvantaged when prime con-
tractors favored their friends or other persons with whom
they had existing relationships.
72
Justice Stevens concluded that "race [was] not al-
ways irrelevant to governmental decisionmaking."'I In
the decisionmaking process, race was relevant "when
there [was] a meaningful basis for assuming its rel-
evance."74 For example, in Justice Steven's opinion, con-
sidering race was a legitimate means of achieving diver-
sity75 and assisting DBEs to overcome disadvantages as-
sociated with being a minority DBE.76 Justice Stevens
reasoned that the SCC program was constitutional be-
cause race was not the sole criterion for eligibility.7" In
fact, minorities who were not socially and economically
disadvantaged would not qualify.
78
Finally, Justice Stevens determined that Fullilove
governed the outcome of Adarand.79 In his view, the
SCC program was far less objectionable than the Fullilove
program that expressly set aside ten percent of all pub-
lic contracts for minority contractors.80 Yet, the Fullilove
program satisfied strict scrutiny. Thus, "it must follow as
night follows the day that the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment upholding [the] more carefully crafted [SCC] pro-
gram should be affirmed."8' 1
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Souter
in another dissenting opinion. Those Justices averred that
Second, a senator's vote against confirmation of Thurgood
Marshall to keep African Americans off the Supreme Court
bench is a far cry from President Johnson's consideration of
race as a positive factor for the nominee's selection. Id. at 2121.
69 Id. at 2122-23 (citing Wygant 476 U.S. at 316-17
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
70 115 S. Ct. at 2128-30.




7Id. at 2128 (citing Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,311-19 (1978);Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288).





an intermediate standard of analysis was proper, but con-
curred with Justice Stevens' position that Fullilove was
controlling.82 Justice Souter pointed out that remedial
statutes should be subjected to a tripartite analysis in-
volving a factual showing of the current effects of past
discrimination, the necessity for a preferential remedy,
and the suitability of the proposed preference-s3 Then,
as Justice Stevens had done, Justice Souter decided that
the SCC program passed constitutional muster84
Finally, Justice Ginsburg, after joining Justices
Stevens and Souter, wrote a separate dissent emphasiz-
ing the persistent need for affirmative action programs."'
Refuting Justice Scalia's assertion that we are all one
race, Justice Ginsburg wrote that, historically, the no-
tion of one race had not been embraced in the United
States. 6 Consequently, there were lingering effects of
prodigious discrimination that were evident not only in
the marketplace but also the workplace and the com-
munity.8 7 Justice Ginsburg would not disturb the incen-
tive programs and would leave it to Congress to modify
them as societal conditions changed. ss She wrote, "[g]iven
this history and its practical consequences, Congress
surely can conclude that a carefully designed affirma-
tive action program may help to realize, finally, the 'equal
protection of the laws' the Fourteenth Amendment has
promised since 1868."89
At this juncture, four Justices-Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer-would uphold the SCC
program. Justice O'Conor's opinion in Croson and her
statements in Adarand suggest that she would approve
certain affirmative action measures taken as remedial
action, but she would not uphold quotas.90 Evidently,
Justices Scalia and Thomas would not join a decision to
uphold any affirmative action program.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF ADARAND
The Adarand opinion started a flurry of activity for
and against affirmative action.9' On July 19, 1995, just
MId. at 2131.
1 Id. at 2132. Even Supreme Court Justices misunder-
stand affirmative action objectives.
84Id.





'*See, eg., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (clarifying that
strict scrutiny did not mean fatal in fact); Croson, 489 U.S. at
499. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor wrote: "When race-based
action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such ac-
tion is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "nar-
row tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases."
115 S. Ct. at 2117.
91 See generally Kenneth Jost, AfterAdarandA.B.A.J., Sept.
1995, at 70-75.
weeks after the Supreme Court decided Adarand, Presi-
dent Clinton held a press conference at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C. The President reaffirmed
his administration's commitment to "vigorous, effective
enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination."2 He
proclaimed that consistent with Adarand the Clinton
administration would explore ways to eli-inate discrimi-
nation in employment, education, and government con-
tracting.93 Meanwhile, he pledged that "the Federal Gov-
ernment [would] continue to support lawful consider-
ation of race,... under programs that are flexible, realis-
tic, subject to reevaluation, and fair." 94
In furtherance of his administration's commitment,
President Clinton directed all federal administrators to
reevaluate affirmative action programs under their con-
trol. He specifically referenced federal programs that
provide opportunities or benefits to groups of people
based upon their race or ethnicity.95 At the end of his
pronouncement, the President suggested criteria for re-
viewing federal affirmative action programs. Agencies
must modify or eliminate programs that effected prefer-
ences for unqualified individuals, quotas, or reverse dis-
crimination, and those programs that continued after
their equal opportunity purposes lapsed.
96
A few agencies immediately responded to the
President's directive. For example, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) issued a new diversity handbook
advising managers and supervisors to explore hiring and
promotion alternatives to achieve more diversity at the
FAA. The objective was to increase the percentage of
minorities and women in managerial positions.
97
Upon reviewing its affirmative action programs, the
Department of Defense suspended its fifty-eight-year-
old "Rule of Two" program.98 Under that program, if at
least two qualified DBEs wanted to bid on a Depart-
ment of Defense contract, only DBEs could compete
for that particular contract. Minority-owned businesses
predominated as certified businesses for those contract 99
After Adarand, Department of Justice and civil rights
92 Remarks by the President on Affirmative Action, July
19, 1995, at *1, 1995 WL 423980 (White House).
93d.
91 Id. (emphasis added).
9s3d.
96Id.
97 Ruth Larson, FAA put diversity above qualifications,
WAsH. TimEs, Aug. 16, 1995, atA1 (opining that diversity has
taken priority over qualifications).
98 See Equal Opportunity Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R.
2128 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (state-
ment of Deval Patrick, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Divi-
sion) [hereinafter Patrick Testimony].
99 The program had been in effectsince 1937.Ann Devroy,
Rule aiding minority firms to end, WASH. PoSr, Oct. 22, 1995,
atAl.
lawyers surmised that the "Rule of Two" program had
become vulnerable.'00 Reassuringly, Department of Jus-
tice officials did indicate, however, that minority busi-
nesses would continue to benefit from other affirmative
action programs that Adarand did not affect. To salvage
some programs, Department of Justice personnel would
refine or alter them so that they would survive scrutiny
under Adarand.'0'
Sixteen days after the Supreme Court decided
Adarand, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel sent a memorandum to federal general coun-
sels. The purpose of the memorandum was to provide
legal guidance on the implications of Adarand. For the
Department of Justice, AssistantAttomey GeneralWalter
Dellinger wrote that although Adarand involved a gov-
ernment contract dispute, strict scrutiny applied to fed-
eral government use of race-based criteria in health, edu-
cation, hiring, and other areas as well. 02
Dellinger highlighted uncertainties about the
Adarand decision. For one thing, the Court had failed
to discuss the strict scrutiny test in detail. It had failed
to state whether Congress should receive deference when
it found that affirmative action was a necessary response
to remedy past discrimination.0 31 Dellinger also pondered
two other quandaries. First, the Court did not decide
whether the federal government should amass evidence
of past discrimination before it took remedial action.
Second, Adarand expressly held that remedying past
discrimination constituted a compelling interest, but it
did not address whether diversity and inclusion were
legitimate compelling interests. |°4
In light of the Court's decision and the President's
directive, Dellinger proposed a checklist of questions for
agencies to use for their program reviews. He concluded
by saying that "Adarand makes it necessary to evaluate
federal programs that use race or ethnicity as a basis for
decision-making to determine if they satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. No affirmative action program should
be suspended prior to such an evaluation."05
With similar fortitude on September 7,1995, Judith
Winston, the General Counsel for the United States
Department of Education, wrote a letter to college and
university counsel regarding the potential impact that
Adarand had on educational programs. Winston was
confident that Adarand would not change the Depart-
"00 Id. See also Patrick Testimony, supra note 98.
1011d.
'0 Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7.
"3id. at 12-14.
'4 Id. at 8-9.
'0-11d. at 34.
10 Letter from Judith Winston, General Counsel, U.S.
Dept. of Educ., to college and university counsel 2-3 (Sept. 7,
1995).
107 1d.
10s Justice Department's Civil Rights Division: Hearings on
Fiscal 1996 Authorization Request for the Civil Rights Division
ment of Education's policy on race-based financial aid.
The Department of Education determined that congres-
sionally authorized financial aid did not violate Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. 06
Winston assured advocates that if the Department
of Justice eventually found that a financial aid program
fell short of Adarand standards, the Department of Edu-
cation would modify the program. Like Dellinger, Win-
ston ended with an optimistic outlook: "under govern-
ing legal standards, race-targeted student aid is legal in
appropriate circumstances as a remedy for past discrimi-
nation or as a tool to achieve a diverse student body.
Scholarships for these purposes are vital to the educa-
tion of all students."'
07
Obviously, many commentators echoed President
Clinton's sentiments about the need for affirmative ac-
tion programs. One day after President Clinton gave his
affirmative action address, Deval Patrick, the Attorney
General for Civil Rights, appeared before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. Emphati-
cally, Patrick told the Subcommittee that Adarand "cer-
tainly does not signal the end of affirmative action."08
Later, another editorialist wrote,
[A]ffirmative action must stay, for as Clinton pointed
out, equality of opportunity has not been attained
for minorities and women. Simply banking on laws
against discrimination to change that won't work.
Abandoning affirmative action will only reinvigo-
rate practices that for so long blocked more than
half the nation from access to equal opportunity in
education, employment, promotion and contracts.'
In late 1995, outgoing American Bar Association
(ABA) President George E. Bushnell, Jr. revealed the
ABA's position on affirmative action. Bushnell referred
to the ABA's past commitment to affirmative action and
vowed that the association would continue to support
affirmative action in the future."0 Speaking for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Attor-
ney Elaine Jones also defended affirmative action pro-
grams. "To get beyond race," she said, "we must take it
into account.""'
While President Clinton, his administration, and
other public and private officials were striving to main-
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(statement of Deval
Patrick, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Division) (remind-
ing the Subcommittee that strict scrutiny is not"strict in theory,
but fatal in fact'.
1'9 Mend It, Don't End It -A Sensible Middle Course, USA
TODAY, July 20, 1995, at 10A (calling the University of Cali-
fornia Board of Regents' dismantling of affirmative action "an
ill-considered move').
110 James Podgers, ABA House Backs Affirnative Action,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 18.
3I1d.
tain legal affirmative action programs, others, including
presidential candidates, busily sought to completely dis-
mantle the system. For example, Governor Pete Wilson
instituted plans to roll back all affirmative action pro-
grams in the State of California. Previously, he and re-
gents of the University of California canceled a univer-
sity policy of considering ethnicity and gender to admit
college students." 2
Presidential aspirants used their platforms to sound
warnings to conservative constituents. Patrick Buchanan
stated that President Clinton's "plan to perpetuate gov-
ernment-sponsored racial discrimination is unjust and
unconstitutional."' 3 Former presidential candidate
Lamar Alexander, declared that "it is unAmerican to treat
people as members of a group rather than as individu-
als. Unfortunately, President Clinton's report fails to rec-
ognize this fundamental principle."'
14
After Adarand, politicians offered resolutions to
either limit, ban, or weaken affirmative action. Again,
Senator Dole expressed his dissatisfaction with affirma-
tive action. In lieu of affirmative action programs, Dole
recommended enforcement of anti-discrimination laws
to punish those who disobey the laws and compensate
those who are oppressed."s Therefore, on July 27, 1995,
Senator Dole and Representative Charles Canadysimul-
taneously introduced the Equal Opportunity Act of
1995116 in the House and Senate to eliminate so-called
race- and gender-based preferences in the federal gov-
ernment.
Supposedly, the bills protected federal affirmative
action programs while prohibiting preferences. They
112B. DrummondAyres, Jr., On AffirmativeAction, Wlson's
Moderate Path Veered Quickly to the Right, N.Y. TimES, Aug. 8,
1995, at Al. See also Tena Jamison, Is it the Beginning of the
EndforAffirmativeAction.' 22 Hum. Rrs. 14,15 (1995) [herein-
after Jamison] (indicating a 14-10 regents' decision); Wilson
Wants to Eliminate AllAffirmativeAction Programs (NBC tele-
vision broadcast, July 19, 1995)(interviewing California Gov-
ernor Pete Wilson who said, "We should have a complete
colorblind meritocracy-that is the way."); Arleen Jacobius,
Affirmative Action On Way Out in Calif,A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995,
at 22 (surmising that without affirmative action, the "law
school population [will be] made up mostly of white and
Asian students").
I" Bill Nichols, Clinton backs biased benefits-offers reforms
meant to 'mend' affirmative action, USA ToDAY, July 20, 1995,
at Al.
114 Bill Nichols, Clinton runs it up the middle-plays it safe
with 'reform, not roll back', USA TODAY, July 20, 1995, at A3.
115 Senator Robert Dole, Clinton missed mark on affirma-
tive action, USA TODAY, July 20, 1995, at 1 IA. See also Todd
S. Purdum, President gives affirmative support to fighting bias,
N.Y. TiMES, July 20, 1995, at Al (vowing "to get the federal
government out of the group-preference business").
116 Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, S. 1085, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S10,827-01,
S10,829-31 (1995); H.t 2128,104th Cong., 1stSess. (1995).
defined "granting a preference" as "use of any preferen-
tial treatment [including] use of a quota, set aside, nu-
merical goal, timetable, or other numerical objective."'1
7
They forbade the federal government to "grant a prefer-
ence to any individual or group based in whole or in
part on race, color, national origin, or sex, in connection
with - (A) a Federal contract or subcontract; (B) Federal
employment; or (C) any other Federally conducted pro-
gram or activity . .. ", They also prohibited encourag-
ing contractor or subcontractor preferences for individu-
als or groups based on race or gender."9 Over seventy
co-sponsors in the House of Representatives supported
Canady's bill.2 0 Dole's Senate co-sponsors included
Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, Alan Simpson of Wyo-
ming, Jon Kyl of Arizona, Hank Brown of Colorado, Don
Nickles of Oklahoma, Charles Grassley of Iowa, and
Richard Shelby of Alabama.1
2'
In another effort to obliterate affirmative action
in federal contracting, Senator Phil Gramm of Texas
unsuccessfully attempted to amend a legislative de-
fense appropriations bill on July 20, 1995. Gramm
proposed a prohibition on funding contracts awarded
based on race, color, national origin, or gender. 2 2 In-
ter alia, Gramm Amendment No. 1825 provided that
"none of the funds made available by this Act may be
used by any unit of the legislative braiich of the Fed-
eral Government to award any Federal contract, or
to require or encourage the award of aiir subcontract,
if such award is based, in whole or in part, on the
race, color, national origin, or gender of the contrac-
tor or the subcontractor."'1 Sixty-one legislators re-
See also Jamison, supra note 112, at 15 (noting Dole and
Gramm's intent to introduce legislation).
" 141 CONG. REc. S10,827-01, S10,829-31.
"81d. § 2.
"
9 Id. § 2(2). William J. Bennett, Empower America;
Linda Chavez, Center for Equal Opportunity; Milton Bins,
Chairman of the Council of 100 (a national network of Afri-
can American Republicans); the Center for New Black Lead-
ership; and the Independent Women's Forum supported
Dole's bill. 141 CONG. REc. at S10,831-32 (providing writ-
ten statements proclaiming the color-blind aspects of the leg-
islation).
'20.H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), 141 CONG.
R c. H7916 (daily ed. July 27, 1995)(listing all the co-spon-
sors).
11 141 CONG. Rc. at S10,828 (Sen. Dole presenting S.
1085).
1, 141 CONG. REc. S10,402 (July 20, 1995).The bill was
offered "to ensure equal opportunity and merit selection in
the award of Federal contracts." Id.
3 Id. Senators Murray, Daschle, Moseley-Braun, and
Cohen made a counterproposal. They would substitute the
language in Gramm's amendment with the following text:
"None of the funds made available in this Act may be used
for any program for the selection of Federal Government
contractors when such program results in the award of Fed-
jected the bill while thirty-six legislators voted for
it.1
2 4
Apparently, Senator Gramm, Senator Dole, Rep-
resentative Canady, and their supporters ignored ABA
correspondence. To its credit, the ABA sent a letter
to all House and Senate committees with jurisdic-
tion over affirmative action programs. In the letter,
the ABA noted its opposition to any legislation that
would eliminate federal affirmative action programs
involving employment and contracting.
25
This year is a presidential election year. Seem-
ingly, presidential candidates Dole and Buchanan and
other politicians have forgotten the invaluable effect
of affirmative action on many constituents. Because
of affirmative action, tens of thousands of African
Americans, other minorities, and women were edu-
cated, employed, and successful in business. These
tens of thousands of minorities and women are vot-
ers, too. As voters, they should go to the polls and
vote en masse to show these dissenters that rolling
back affirmative action to pre-1965 status will not
be tolerated.
IV. THE LIKELIHOOD THATTHE SCC PROGRAM
WILL SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY ON RE-
MAND
eral contracts to unqualified persons, in reverse discrimina-
tion, or in quotas, or is inconsistent with the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Adarand Construc-
tor, Inc. v. Pena on June 12, 1995." Id.
Later, that day, Senators Gramm and Moseley-Braun
sparred again. In support of his proposal, Gramm testified:
Two wrongs do not make a right. We cannot correct in-
equity in America by making inequity the law of the land.
We cannot correct things that happened 200 years ago by
discriminating against people in America in 1995.
The only way to have a dean break with the unfairness
of the past is to purge unfairness from the present and the
future. I believe we need to be absolutely relentless in en-
forcing the civil rights laws. It is fundamentally wrong to give
somebody a job when someone else is better qualified. It is
fundamentally wrong to promote someone based on some
privilege they are are granted, rather than promoting the per-
son who had the better record.
It is profoundly wrong, in fact it is un-American, to give
somebody a contract when they were not the low bidder, when
they were not the high quality bidder. I do not believe that
two wrongs make a right....
Id. at S10,409. A few minutes later, Senator Moseley-
Braun responded:
The Senator from Texas keeps referring to two wrongs
not making a right. We all know that the first wrong which he
refers to, the history as well as the present experience that we
had in this Nation, was discrimination.
Let me submit to everyone who is listening, the second
wrong is not affirmative action. It is not our effort to fix that
tragic legacy. The second wrong lies in this amendment in shut-
ting the door, dosing down the small efforts, the small steps
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which
abridges the privileges or immunities of the citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.2 6
The same guarantees apply to the federal government
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.1' 7 After Adarand, this means that state, local,
and federal governments may not impose a racial classi-
fication 2 8 unless it promotes a compelling interest and
it is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.' This
section discusses whether the Act, STURAA, and the
SCC program are narrowly tailored to complete the
government's objectives.
Complaining that the program utilized race-con-
scious criteria to achieve the legislative requirements of
the Act and STURAA, Adarand launched a constitu-
tional challenge against DOT's SCC program. Consis-
tently, the United States Supreme Court held that race-
based classifications in statutes and programs, like
STURAA, the Act, and the SCC program, were inher-
ently and constitutionally suspect. Racial distinctions "are
we have taken, to remedy, to provide for opportunity, to give
people a shot, to give people a chance.
I say to my colleagues, as someone who is both minority
and female, I am not comforted at the notion that by getting
rid of affirmative action anybody is doing me a favor. So I en-





32s McMillion, supra note 8, at 93.
26 U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV, § 2.
2'2 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111;Weinburger v.Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
498-99 (1954).
228 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (holding that all state, local, and
federal governmental racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430 (1984); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (indicating that the central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimi-
nation emanating from official sources in the states); Bolling
347 U.S. at 497, 499 (finding that the Constitution forbids
government or state discrimination based on race); Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879).
129Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment dearly applies to states:
The FourteenthAmendment directly empowers Congress
[while] it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It
represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experi-
ence throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the
Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial
by their very nature odious to a free people."130 Accord-
ingly, the racial classification in the SCC program is in-
herently suspect and must be examined in accordance
with strict scrutiny.
3 '
However, case precedent demonstrates that race-
conscious criteria in the SCC, STURAA, and the Act
are constitutional. In Fulilove v. Klutznick,132 a 1980 de-
cision, the Supreme Court reviewed a federal remedial
race-based provision in the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 (PWEA).13 3 Under the PWEA, state or lo-
cal public works grantees were required to make a good
faith effort to identify qualified, bona fide minority busi-
ness enterprises. Grantees were expected to award at
least ten percent of their contracts to those businesses. 1
34
Then grantees were obliged to provide technical assis-
tance for bonding, solicit federal aid for working capital,
and guide minority contractors through the bidding pro-
cess. 1
35
The Fullilove Court examined the PWEA using a
two-pronged analysis encompassing whether Congress
had the power to enact the legislation and whether race
and ethnicity were constitutionally permissible consid-
erations for achieving Congress' objectives.136 The Court
responded to those queries by giving significant defer-
ence to Congress' remedial powers. "It is fundamental
that in no organ of government, state or federal, does
there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than
in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution
with competence and authority to enforce equal pro-
tection guarantees."
37
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress' goal of
fostering equal opportunities for minority businesses to
obtain federal grants 3 8 was well within the scope of
Congress' spending power, the Commerce Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment.'3 As a consequence, the
Fullilove Court determined that Congress legitimately
enacted the PWEA to give minority groups "equitable
footing with respect to public contracting opportuni-
minorities against the States, some of which may be inclined
to oppress such minorities....
Id. at 2126 (Stevens, Ginsburg, J1, dissenting).
'
3 0 Id. at 2106 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91;
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191-92; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (call-
ing racial classifications "constitutionally suspect"); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that legal
restrictions against a racial group are "immediately suspect").
'3' See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91; McLaughlin, 379 U.S.
at 191-92; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (requiring scrutiny "with
particular care"); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
132448 U.S. 448 (1980).
'3391 Stat. 116.
3 448 U.S. at 481.
1
3
1 Id. at 480.
36Id. at 473.
37Id. at 483.
ties," and not to bestow a preference over other contrac-
tors.
140
The Court then resolved the question regarding
whether Congress could justify using race and ethnicity
to accomplish its goal. When Congress promulgated the
PWEA, it had access to and properly considered data
showing that minority business enterprises received a
disproportionately small percentage of public con-
tracts.'4' Additionally, the Court found that the PWEA
was constitutional because it incorporated administra-
tive mechanisms to protect grantees and to ensure that
unqualified minority business enterprises could not take
advantage of the program. One safeguard allowed grant-
ees to obtain administrative waivers if they proved that
despite their diligent efforts, they could not secure at
least ten percent minority business participation. An-
other safeguard was a complaint procedure for challeng-
ing minority businesses' qualifications for the program.
1 4
7
That provision ensured that only bona fide minority
businesses benefited from the program.
Setting aside ten percent of public contracts meant
that non-minority firms would be ineligible to receive
those contracts. The Court determined, however, that
forbidding non-minority participation did not create a
"constitutional defect in th[e] program:"'43 The Court
reasoned that to cure the effects of prior discrimination,
innocent contractors had to share the burden of effectu-
ating the remedy.'" After this searching examination,
the Court decided that the PWEA did not violate the
Constitution.
145
As previously indicated in part II, four Justices in
Adarand and federal government advocates contended
that Fulilove was controlling. The federal program in
Fulilove had some goals and provisions:that were simi-
lar to the goals and provisions in the SCC program. On
the other hand, Adarand and other Justices averred that
Croson was decisive.
'
3 8 Id. This is allowed as long as the minority business en-
terprise could demonstrate that the higher cost reflected the
effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination.




4z Id. at 482 (denying access to businesses that were not
impaired by prior discrimination).
143Id. at 484.
144 The Court further noted that, in actuality, minority
contractors had withstood a much heavier burden than non-
minority firms would be subjected to under the provisions of
the PWEA. Id. at 484-85 n.72 (indicating that the ten percent
minority business participation would account for approxi-
mately .25 percent of the 4.2 billion dollars in federal grants
for construction work in the United States).
1
45 Id. at 492. It is noteworthy that the Court stated that
the PWEA would survive judicial review under the test ap-
plied in Bakze. Id.
Actually, both Croson and Fullilove provide guid-
ance regarding whether the SCC program should sur-
vive strict scrutiny. In Croson, a city ordinance issued
a mandate to contractors who were recipients of city
contract awards. They were required to subcontract
at least thirty percent of the contract value to busi-
nesses that were owned and controlled by members
of designated racial and ethnic groups. City legisla-
tors intended to remedy past discrimination that mi-
nority business enterprises had experienced in the
local construction industry.
46
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion in
Croson. The Croson Court held that attempting to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, whether
public or private, constituted a compelling interest
that could justify governmental racial dassifications.
47
The Court ruled, however, that affirmative action
programs could not be based upon general societal
discrimination.'"While there is no doubt that the sorry
history of both private and public discrimination in
this country has contributed to a lack of opportuni-
ties for black entrepreneurs, this observation, stand-
ing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the
awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Vir-
ginia." 4s Neither would amorphous claims of past
discrimination. 4 9 The City of Richmond was required
to specifically describe the discrimination that it in-
tended to rectify.
"[A] prima facie [showing] of a constitutional or
statutory violation" of minority citizens' rights would
be sufficient to justify governmental affirmative ac-
tion programs.'5 0 For example, "gross statistical dis-
parities" between the number of minority participants
and the percentage of qualified minority participants
would suffice.' 5' In contrast, underrepresentation of
minorities in comparison with the number of minori-
ties in the general population would not provide ad-
equate support to justify an affirmative action pro-
gram.S2
In Croson, the Richmond program failed the strict
scrutiny test because the evidence presented did not
show that government contractors were discriminating
against minority businesses. 5 3 The program also failed
146488 U.S. at 498-500.
W Two types of discrimination were affected: 1) the gov-
ernment could remedy the effects of its own discrimination,
and 2) the government could remedy the effects of private
discrimination that occurred within its jurisdiction while the
government, as a "passive participant," had helped to perpetu-
ate the discrimination. Id. at 492.
'
48 Id. at 499.
149 Id. (reasoning that the government would be unable to
determine the scope of the injury it sought to remedy and
would lack a "logical stopping point"). Id. at 498.
1S0M. at 500.
"I Id. at 507.
152M.d
because it constituted an inflexibly "rigid numerical
quota" that did not disqualify minority participants who
had not suffered from the effects of past discrimina-
tion.' 4 Furthermore, the program was over-inclusive.
Although the city intended to remedy discrimination
against African-American contractors, the ordinance
named Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native Americans,
Eskimos, and Aleuts as other beneficiaries of the pro-
gram. ss Moreover, the Court was concerned that eligi-
bility requirements were so broad that successful mi-
nority entrepreneurs who were not Richmond
domiciliaries would be able to participate. 
1
16
Now that the Court has ruled that the same scru-
tiny applies to all governmental classifications, the ques-
tion about whether Fullilove and Croson applies really is
moot. Fulilove and Croson both apply. In any event, the
SCC program satisfies the requirements set forth in
Croson and Fulilove.
With respect to the pending Adarand decision,
armed with the foregoing information from Croson
and Fullilove, the federal government knows that rec-
tifying past discrimination is at least one legitimate
compelling interest that the Court would uphold. In
addition, the federal government knows precisely how
the SCC program must be tailored to meet that and
any other goal.
Upon remand in Adarand, the federal government
must demonstrate a compelling interest for establish-
ing government-wide goals for DBE participation in
federal contracting. Under Croson, although racism
still exists in America, the SCC program would not
be legitimate if it were solely based on societal dis-
crimination. 5 7 There are, however, three possible
compelling reasons for the incentive programs that
are-well-documented.
First, as the Act required, a DOT agency designed
the program for the legitimate purpose of providing
subcontracting opportunities for small DBEs.1s8 Ad-
ditionally, "[tihe [SCC program] ... fostered nation-
wide economic development by permitting small dis-
advantaged businesses to share in the economic ben-
efit of the government's vast purchasing activity ...
[and] by working with them,... the government can
' The evidence did demonstrate general societal discrimi-
nation. For instance, the city argued that there was a disparity
between the number of prime contracts that the city awarded
minorities between 1973 and 1978 and the city's fifty percent
minority population. Moreover, the city claimed, there was a
very low number of minority contractors that were members
of the local contractors trade associations. Id. at 504-06.
Is Id. at 508.
'
5
1 Id. at 506.
6Id. at 508.
57 Id. at 504-06. See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 ("soci-
etal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis
for imposing a racially classified remedy').
I's16 F.3d at 1546.
strengthen such businesses and thereby enhance mar-
ket competition for the goods and services the govern-
ment buys."
Second, in prior decisions, the Supreme Court has
ruled that Congress was not required to make specific
findings of discrimination to provide race-conscious re-
lief' 6 However, when the SCC program is reviewed
under the strict scrutiny analysis, the federal government
will have the initial burden of producing specific evi-
dence to justify the program.16' Generalized assertions
of past discrimination will not suffice to show that re-
medial action is necessary. "In assessing whether the gov-
ernmental unit has a 'strong basis in evidence' for im-
posing race-conscious relief, the proffered evidence must
approach a prima facie case of constitutional or statu-
tory violation."'6 For instance, the government may in-
troduce statistical evidence that the number of quali-
fied minority businesses would have been larger but for
discrimination.'6 Evidence that was available to the gov-
ernment when the program was implemented and when
the program was challenged will be admissible.6
Establishing that there is a huge disparity between
the number of qualified minority businesses and the
number that receive federal contracts will not be a diffi-
cult task. For some time, congressional findings unequivo-
cally confirm that qualified minority businesses were not
receiving highway construction contracts. In 1978, when
the SBA added race as one criteria for determining a
subcontractor's eligibility, Congress found that social and
economic discrimination deprived minority
businesspersons of the "opportunity to participate fully
in the free enterprise system."16s At subsequent hearings,
commenced after the 1978 legislation was enacted, Con-
159 Brief for the Respondents at 4-5, Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1994).
'60 Croson, 488 U.S. at 489; Fullilove 448 U.S. at 478.
61 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500; Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 26 F3d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); Concrete Works
v. City and County of Denver; 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Donaghy v. City
of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1458 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1059 (1991).Then the burden would shift toAdarand
to show that the government's measures are unconstitutional.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78; Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521-
22; Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F3d 990, 1005
(3d Cir. 1993).
'62 Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1553 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at
500).
163 Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1008; O'Donnell Constr.
Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 E2d 420,427 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
'6 488 U.S. at 504; Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521;
Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1004; Coral Constr. Co. v. King
County, 941 F.2d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1033 (1992).
16Ss. REP. No. 1070, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978). See
also H. R. REP. No. 1714,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978).
gress reached the same conclusion that "discrimina-
tion and the present effects of past discrimination
[had] hurt socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals in their entrepreneurial endeavors." 66 The
DBE provision in STURAA was enacted for similar
reasons.1
67
Undoubtedly, statistical information shows that the
pool of qualified minorities is woefully disproportion-
ate to the number of minority businesspersons who re-
ceive government contract awards. Not only is there a
dearth of minority businesses, but the few minority re-
cipients receive only minuscule allocations of federal
government contracts. In 1980, when Croson was de-
cided, minority contractors were receiving less than one
percent of federal contracts in the City of Richmond. 16s
Six years later, prime contracts totaled approximately
$185 billion. Only $5 billion-a paltry 2.7 percent of
the total value of prime contracts-was awarded to mi-
nority businesses.'0 Subcontractors did not do any bet-
ter. From 1977 through 1987, less than two percent of
the total value of subcontracts was awarded to minority
businesses 7 0
In the 1990s, the percentage of contracts awarded
to minority businesses has not increased significantly.
Presently, the United States construction industry is a
$450 billion industry. Approximately 100 billion of that
amount represents revenue in government contracts.
Now, minority-owned businesses constitute six percent
of this country's construction firms, but they only re-
ceive 1.4 percent of available construction business.
"[M]ost of that [one] percent comes from government
contracts-affirmative action-that mandate [minority]
involvement."1 '
166H.R. REP. No. 460, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1987)(noting the continuing effect of discrimination on mi-
nority businesses).
16S. REP. No. 4, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1987), re-
printed in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 66, 76 (recording the necessity
of remedying "the discrimination faced by socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons'3.
'68 488 U.S. at 499.
169 H.R. REP. No. 460, supra note 166, at 18.
'7' See H.R. REP. No. 94-1791 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 94-
468 (1975); Bimbaum, "Report on New Initiatives, Techniques,
and Incentives for Increasing Subcontracting Opportunities for
Small Disadvantaged Businesses, Prepared for the Small Busi-
ness Administration (January 1989).
Additionally, Supreme Court Justices have accepted Con-
gress' conclusion that "private and governmental discrimina-
tion [] contributed to the negligible percentage of public con-
tracts awarded minority contracts." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 503
(Powell, J., concurring). See id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in judgment)("race-conscious means were necessary to
break down the barriers confronting participation by minority
enterprises...").
171 Id. Gilliam, supra note 2, at H9. See also Affirmative
Action: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Third, neither Croson nor Adarand addressed
whether diversity would be a compelling justification
for an affirmative action program. In Regents of Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,'72 however, Justice Powell con-
duded that the University of California had a compel-
ling interest in fostering greater diversity among its stu-
dents. His rationale was that diversity would create a
wider range of perspectives on campus and would con-
tribute to a more robust exchange of ideas.In Justice
Stephens restated that view in his dissenting opinion in
Adarand.174 Similarly, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.,175 the
Supreme Court upheld a Federal Communications Com-
mission policy that allowed enhancements for minority
and female applicants who sought radio and television
broadcast licences.176The Court decided that the FCC's
"interest in fostering the program broadcast diversity
[was] an important governmental objective [that was] a
sufficient basis for the Commission's minority owner-
ship policies."
177
Fostering racial and ethnic diversity alone may not
constitute a compelling interest, 78 but the Supreme Court
has previously recognized that diversity may promote other
societal benefits. For example, in United States v. Paradise,179
Justice O'Connor wrote that diversity enabled police of-
ficers to establish a better relationship with a community
and to maintain law and order more effectively.180
The SCC program promotes a societal benefit by
helping to diversify the marketplace. In our growing
multicultural society, such diversification is advantageous
to all businesspersons. Diverse employees share their
varied experiences and knowlege to enrich the business.
Additionally, businesspersons from different racial and
ethnic backgrounds have the ability to cultivate relation-
ships between minority customers and non-minority
House Comm. on the Judiciary (1995)(testimony of Reginald
Wilson, Ph.D.)(gaining "a foothold in [the construction indus-
try] mostly through affirmative action"); Women, Minorities
Still Lag in Government Contrabting, L.A. Tirf.s, Sept. 11,1995,
at 1 ("Even with affirmative action, we're still only getting
crumbs."). Cf Thomas Madden and Kevin Kordziel, Strict Scru-
tiny and the Future of Federal Procurement Set-Aside Programs
in the Wake of Adarand: Does 'Strict in Theory' Mean 'Fatal in
Fact'? 64 BNA-FCR 6 (1995)(claiming that set-aside programs
reduced the statistical disparity between contract awards to
non-minority and minority businesses).
172438 U.S. 265 (1978).
1731d. at 311-14.
'74Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2124 (Stephens, J., dissenting);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 511-12 & n.1 (Stephens, J., concurring);
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646-47
(1987) (Stephens, J., concurring); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-15
(Stephens, J., dissenting). See also O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963
F.2d at 429 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
175497 U.S. 547 (1990).
176Id. at 555-58.
7 Id. at 567-68. Although Adarand overruled the por-
tion of Metro Broadcasting Inc that applied an intermediate
standard
businesses. Thus, non-minority businesspersons who
wisely elect to do business with minority businesspersons
can increase their profits by reaching wider, more diver-
sified markets.'8' In summary, on remand, the federal
government may proffer three compelling interests-
assisting small businesses to become successful, remedy-
ing past discrimination, and promoting diversity-to sat-
isfy the first part of the strict scrutiny analysis.
Under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the
government must show that its use of race is narrowly tai-
lored to advancing its compelling goals. 'There appear to be
two underlying purposes of the narrow tailoring test: first, to
ensure that race-based affirmative action is the product of
careful deliberation, not hasty decision-making; and, second,
to ensure that such action is truly necessary, and that less in-
trusive, efficacious means to the end are unavailable!"8
As the mechanism for administering the goals pro-
visions of section 644 (g) of the Act and STURAA, the
SCC should be analyzed under the narrow tailoring
prong of strict strutiny. In Adarand, Croson, and Fullilove,
the Supreme Court considered several factors to ascer-
tain whether a classification was narrowly tailored.Those
factors included: whether race-neutral alternatives were
explored, the scope of the classification, whether race is
one of many factors or a determinative factor in deter-
mining eligibility, the number of participants compared
to the number of qualified participants, the duration of
the program, the review process, and the burden placed
on non-minority individuals. 83 Affirmative action pro-
grams need not satisfy every factor.'4 Moreover, the strict
scrutiny test does not require that the government ex-
haust every possible alternative to a race-based pro-
gram. 5 In short, the government is not required to use
the least restrictive means available. 1 6
of scrutiny, this portion of the Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
opinion was not disturbed. See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
178 Memorandum, supra note 2, at 16-17 (citing Paradise,
480 U.S. at 167 n.18. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (deter-
mining that attempts to develop minority role models for the
community alone is not enough).
179480 U.S. 149 (1987).
"'OId. at 167 n.18.
181 Advocates Try to Tie Diversity to Profit, WALL ST.J., Feb.
7, 1996, at B1.
182 Memorandum, supra note 2, at 19.
'8Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2113,2117,2128,2132; Croson,
488 U.S. at 500, 504-08; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482, 483-86,
492.
18Id.
I'l 941 E2d at 923. Cf Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (suggest-
ing that the City of Richmond provide financial and technical
assistance for small or new businesses as a race-neutral means
of assisting small businesses). See also Id. at 507-10. See id. at
526 (Scalia, J., concurring).
186See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring);
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199-200 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (find-
ing that less intrusive alternatives were available).
Clearly, racial classifications that set aside a specific
number of contracts or positions are impermissible un-
der the strict scrutiny standard. Those that are too rigid
are those such as the City of Richmond's mandatory set-
aside. In comparison, STURAA and the SCC program
are not objectionable. Neither establishes impermissi-
bly rigid standards for government contracts. Further,
neither the Act, STURAA, nor the SCC makes hiring a
DBE mandatory. In fact, STURAA and the SCC program
do not require that primary contractors hire DBEs at all.
The monetary incentive in the program "induces, rather
than compels, prime contractors to hire DBE subcontrac-
tors."18 7
In the Adarand factual situation, Mountain Gravel
knew that it could have awarded the subcontract to
Adarand. Any prime contractor could choose not to ex-
ercise the option to hire a DBE and award a subcontract
without consideration of DBE status. Moreover, although
statistics show that it rarely happens, a prime contractor
is at liberty to contract with a minority subcontractor
that does not qualify as a DBE. Finally, the primary con-
tractor would not lose a contract, or suffer any other
penalty, for refusing to award a subcontract to a DBE."'
As Justice Stevens observed, section 64 4(g) does not
dictate a quota for minority subcontractors. Without
commanding specific percentage goals, section 6 44 (g)
attempts to promote minority business opportunities by
establishing an annual, fluctuating goal for which the
industry should strive It sets a de minimus goal of five
percent participation so that small businesses get the
"maximum practicable opportunity" to obtain contracts.
Under the Act, the number of potential DBE con-
tracts is, and has always been, aspirational, not manda-
tory. First, the President of the United States set an an-
nual percentage goal. Then each federal agency inde-
pendently developed a goal that appropriately matched
that agency's contracting needs and the current market.
In addition, the Act provided that when setting goals,
the President and the agencies should establish goals that
"realistically reflect the potential of [DBEs] to perform
such contracts [or] subcontracts."189 Like the goal an-
nounced in the Act, STURAA set a flexible goal of not
less than ten percent that was waivable 90 Whenever it
was impracticable for an agency to reach the President's
1016 E3d at 1547.
'8 115 S. Ct. at 2130. The ten percent threshold is "an
optional goal, not a set-aside." 16 F.3d at 1542 n. 9.
18 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(2).
190 Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 145, § 106(c)(1); 49
C.F.R. §§ 23.64(e), 23.65.
19 49 C.F.R. §§ 23.64(e), 23.65 (1995).When Mountain
Gravel contracted with Gonzales, the goal, under section
106(c)(1) of the STURAA, was no less than ten percent for
disadvantaged business expenditures. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101
Stat. 145.
19215 U.S.C. § 644(g).
'" Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at 31.
goal, the agency could waive the requirement without a
penalty.9
Just as the word "preference" is conspicously absent
from Executive Order No. 11,246, no preference is given
to minority businesses under the Act, STURAA, or the
SCC program. The dassifications only require that small
businesses owned and controlled by DBEs receive op-
portunities to contract with the government. 92 "Rather
than constituting a preference for disadvantaged sub-
contractors, the compensation clause is designed to re-
move barriers that would otherwise exist to the free
participation by disadvantaged businesses in bidding for
subcontracts on federal highway projects."93
Unlike the City of Richmond program, the SCC
program did not effect a set-aside exclusively for minor-
ity contractors. In some cases, race is not the sole or pri-
mary factor for certifying a subcontractor. 94 While "race
or ethnic background may be a 'plus' [for a particular
contractor], it does not insulate the individual from com-
parison with all other [contractors]."'gs For minority sub-
contractors to qualify, in addition to having minority
ownership or control of operations, the subcontracting
company has to meet other criteria. The company has
to be at least fifty-one percent owned by one or more
people from designated minority groups. DOT regula-
tions only named African Americans, Hispanic Ameri-
cans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific-.Americans, and
Asian-Indian Americans as groups that were socially and
economically disadvantaged. The company has to be
controlled by one or more persons in those selected mi-
nority groups. The company has to be economically dis-
advantaged. It has to be certified as a DBE.
Moreover, minority contractors are not the only con-
tractors who are characterized as DBEs;-Women, physi-
cally disabled businesspersons, and those that are envi-
ronmentally isolated individuals who are not minorities
could be DBEs.'9 5 Thus, the SCC program is not
underindusive because a company's minority status is
not the sole determinate of whether it qualifies as a DBE.
Furthermore, the SCC program is narrowly tailored
because the presumption of social and economic disad-
vantage is rebuttable. 197 If a competitor wants to chal-
lenge a subcontractor's certification, the competitor can
initiate a protest by contacting the contracting officer
194 See, ag., 49 C.F.R. § 23.62. "Minority status is [] nei-
ther a sufficient nor a necessary basis for certification." Brief
for the Respondents, supra note 24, at 13.
195438 U.S. at 317. Cf 488 U.S. at 508 (deciding that the
Richmond plan illegally made "the color of an applicant's skin
the sole relevant consideration").
196See, ag., 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C); Pub. L. No. 100-17,
§ 106(c), 101 Stat. 132, 145 (1987); 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-8
(1995) (defining disadvantaged business to include businesses
owned by women); 49 C.F.R. § 23.62; 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105-
106 (certifying physically disabled and environmentally iso-
lated).
19749 C.ER. §§ 23.62, 23.69(a).
any time before the subcontract work is complete 98 An
investigation and prompt determination regarding the
subcontractor's status is required. 99
Like the PWEA in Fuilove, STURAA, the SCC pro-
gram, and the Act embody administrative assurances that
prevent unqualified minority businesses from benefit-
ing from the programs, so they are not overindusiVe
200
To illustrate, a DBE must pass annual certification re-
views to establish its continuing eligibility.201 Addition-
ally, competitors can protest a business' DBE status at
anytime.202 Those measures prevent ineligible minority
businesses from participating even if they have quali-
fied earlier.20
3
Finally, the Adarand Court ruled, and President
Clinton announced, that affirmative action programs
should last only as long as they are necessary. Presently,
the SCC program is still needed because minority con-
tractors are not receiving their fair share of federal con-
tracts. As a means of tracking DBE progress, DOT must
submit annual reports to the SBA regarding DBE par-
ticipation. In turn, the SBA must compile agency re-
ports and submit them to the President.0 4 When and if
it becomes appropriate someday, government officials
may determine that the Act, STURAA, and the SCC
program no longer serve their purpose or that they have
achieved DOT's and the SBA's objectives.205
The three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit agreed
with the district court and properly concluded the SCC
program is constitutional:
The district court found that the challenged pro-
gram satisfies Fudilove because it serves important
governmental objectives and is substantially related
to achievement of those objectives. The district
court concluded that the challenged program was
narrowly tailored to achieve its statutory objectives
because it does not mandate its provisions in an in-
flexible manner. It ensures minimum impact on non-
DBEs because [tlo qualify for DBE status a business
must demonstrate, via the annual certification pro-
cess, that it is a bonafide DBE, eligible to participate
in the program. The annual certification mechanism
is reasonably calculated to insure legitimate quali-
19249 CF.R. § 23.69 (b)(1) (authorizing any third party to
challenge a certification).
'9 49 C.F.R. § 23.69(b). See also Brief for Respondents,
supra note 24, at 25-26 (advocating that the contractor must
have been subjected to racial prejudice that has caused eco-
nomic disadvantage).
20015 U.S.C. § 637(a)(B)-(C); 49 C.F.R. § 23.69.
7,0 13 C.F.R. § 124.602(a)(1995); 115 S. Ct at 2129. Cf
49 C.F.R. § 23.69 (1994)(urging but not mandating periodic
review).
20213 C.ER. § 124.603 (1995); 49 C.ER. § 23.69.
20115 S. Ct. at 2130. See also WEs r, supra note 8, at 95.
After DBEs overcome their disadvantages, presum-
ably, they will be able to compete for business on an equal
basis and "graduate" from DBE status. Id. See, e.g., Autek Sys.
fled participants, so that the program does not be-
come overinclusive in the sense of tolerating abuse
of the program by non-DBEs. Likewise the program
is not underinclusive since it provides that businesses
not entitled to the presumption of DBE status may
apply for certification and establish their qualifica-
tions to participate. We hold tht the SCC program
is constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to
achieve its significant governmental purpose of pro-
viding subcontracting opportunities for small dis-
advantaged business enterprises, as required under
section [644(g)] of the Small Business Act. The
qualifying criteria of the SCC program is not lim-
ited to members of racial minority groups. Because
eligibility is based on economic disadvantage, non-
minority-owned businesses also are eligible to par-
ticipate. The SCC program is not overinclusive since
minority businesses that do not satisfy the economic
criteria cannot qualify for DBE status. Furthermore,
the SCC program is 'appropriately limited in extent
and duration' because federal procurement and con-
struction contracting practices are subject to regu-
lar 'reassessment and reevaluation by Congress.'2
The SCC program will survive strict scrutiny on remand.
It is grounded upon legitimate compelling governmen-
tal interests and it is narrowly tailored to achieve goals
that maximize opportunities for small businesses to ob-
tain government contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, affirmative action programs remain
essential. Contrary to what Justice Scalia has written,
we are not all one race.All people are not treated equally
yet. Neither minority contractors nor minority profes-
sionals and laborers have achieved equality in the mar-
ketplace. All Americans do not have an equal opportu-
nity to experience the American dream that is promised
in the United States Constitution. That is why an equal-
izer like affirmative action is vital. It ensures that more
people, especially minorities, women, and economically
disadvantaged people, have the same chance to obtain
Corp. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1993), af'd,
43 F.3d 712
(D.C. Cir. 1994)(denying minority business owner disad-
vantaged status because of his personal income); 13 C.F.R. §
124.208 (1995). See also 13 C.F.R. § 124.207 (1995)(listing
reasons for terminating a DBE).
2w 15 U.S.C. § 644(h) (1995).
205 Croson, 488 U.S. at 510; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513
(Powell, J., concurring); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178 (plurality
opinion); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487 (Powell, J.,
concurring)(hiring goal was implemented for a limited dura-
tion).
206Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1546-47 (citations omitted). See
also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486-88, 490, 521.
government contracts, to attend institutions of higher
learning, and to maintain employment as non-minori-
ties do.
Some commentators believe that strict scrutiny is a
virtually insurmountable standard of review and that
"Adarand may constitute the death knell for federal af-
firmative action programs."20 However, other commen-
tators, including this writer, are optimistic that most
programs will survive under the Adarand test. Although
strict scrutiny is the most searching analysis, four Su-
preme Court Justices in Adarand were willing to main-
tain DOT's affirmative action program. Justice O'Connor
reemphasized that strict scrutiny was not intended to
be "fatal in fact." Although she did not express an opin-
ion regarding the legitimacy of the SCC program, Jus-
tice O'Connor previously has favored racial classifica-
tions that remedy past discrimination.208
207 Alan F. Sohn, The United States Supreme CourtAddresses
Racial Issues, W VA LAw., Sept. 1995, at 22-23.
m On the other hand, comments made by Justices Tho-
mas and Scalia in Adarand reveal that proponents of affirma-
tive action cannot count on them for a favorable decision. 115
S. Ct. at 2118.
209BriefAmici Curiae of the National Bar Association and
the Council of 100-An Organization of Black Republicans, Inc.
in Support of Respondents at 15-16, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995)(No. 93-1841)(filed De-
cember 6, 1994)(co-authored by Professors J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
and Cynthia R. Mabry, and attorneys Lisa Wilson and Erroll.
Brown). See also Exec. Order No. 12,928, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,377
(1994) (Clinton advocating that small businesses should have
"a fair opportunity to participate in Federal procurement");
The Clinton administration has pledged its commit-
ment to ensuring that affirmative action programs con-
tinue as long as racism exists. Previously, Demo~ratic
and Republican Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter,
and Reagan encouraged federal agencies to develop pro-
grams that empower small businesses. 9 It is inconceiv-
able that Adarand's challenge will eradicate the Act,
STURAA, or the SCC program.
Finally, even the Adarand Court recognized that
racism still exists: "The unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimina-
tion against minority groups in this country is an unfor-
tunate reality, and [the] government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it."2 1 0 As long as racism exists,
affirmative action must survive.
Exec. Order No. 12,432,48 Fed. Reg. 32,551 (1983) (Reagan
ordering federal agencies to establish means of encouraging
prime contractors to use minority subcontractors); Exec. Or-
der No. 12,190,45 Fed. Reg. 7773 (1980)
(Carter's appointment of an Advisory Committee on Small
and Minority Business Ownership to encourage and monitor
subcontract awards to small businesses, "particularly with small
minority businesses"); Exec. Order No. 11;518, 35 Fed. Reg.
4,939 (1970)
("members of certain minority groups through no fault of
their own have been denied the full opportunity to achieve
these aspirations").
210 115 S. Ct. at 2117. See also 115 S. Ct. at 2129 ("irratio-
nal racial prejudice - along with its lingering effects - still
survives.'".
